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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
should be allowed to prosecute smaller firms and then use the results
of these cases, if favorable, against larger firms who may be less
recalcitrant after the earlier successful action. As the Supreme Court
stated in Moog Industries, " [W]hether all firms in the industry should
be dealt with in a single proceeding or should receive individualized
treatment are questions that call for discretionary determination by
the administrative agency."2 The "patent abuse of discretion" de-
fense allowed by the court in the principal case will, if generally recog-
nized, severely limit the broad enforcement discretion previously
granted the FTC.
CRIMINAL LAW: RIGHT TO COUNSEL-CRITICAL
STAGE TEST IN NON-CONFESSION CASES
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, a
misdemeanor. After being taken to jail, his requests to call an attorney
were denied in accordance with a police department regulation.' De-
fendant's counsel submitted that, if contacted, he would have ordered
a chemical, blood-alcohol test administered by a physician. Convicted
in police court and superior court, defendant appealed to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, which reversed and dismissed the charges. Held:
The time immediately following arrest for driving under the influence
2' 355 U.S. at 413. See also Tait, supra note 17, at 76, 81.
'Tacoma Police Dep't Reg. 46, which provides: "No person charged with an
offense, an element of which is intoxication, shall be denied the right of maldng
such a telephone call after four hours have elapsed from the time of his arrest" The
majority declared the Tacoma regulation to be in conflict with the mandate of
WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.33.020(5) (1956):
No officer or person having the custody and control of the body or liberty of
any person under arrest, shall refuse permission to such arrested person to
communicate with his friends or with an attorney, nor subject any person under
arrest to any form of personal violence, intimidation, indignity or threatsfor the purpose of exhorting from such person incriminating statements or a
confession. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor. (Emphasis added).
Judge Finley, in dissent, felt that the italicized phrase limits the section's
operative effect to denials of opportunity to communicate for the purposes enumerated.
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 747, 409 P.2d at 882. The section has only been applied pre-
viously to challenge the admissibility of confessions when defendant alleged denial
of communication for the purpose of inducing incriminating statements. State v.
Haynes, 58 Wn. 2d 16, 364 P.2d 935 (1961), rev'd, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (reversal
based in part upon § 9.33.020(5)); State v. Miller, 68 Wash. 239, 112 Pac. 1066(1912). Nevertheless, it may be argued that the legislature intended not only to
penalize coerced confession practices, but to encourage communication between
prisoners, family, and counsel. This inferred policy is effectuated by the majority's
assertion of conflict between the police regulation and § 9.33.020(5).
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of alcohol is a "critical stage" in criminal proceedings, during which
defendant is entitled to counsel under the sixth amendment to the fed-
eral constitution.2 City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 721,
409 P.2d 867 (1966).
In Hamilton v. Alabama,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a defendant is entitled to counsel at any "critical stage" in the
proceedings against him. In Escobedo v. Illinois,4 the Court extended
sixth amendment protection to pre-arraignment proceedings. Since
Escobedo, courts have differed on when a right to counsel attaches.
Further, the extent of sixth amendment right to counsel in misde-
meanor cases has rarely been considered, and the few available deci-
sions manifest no definite constitutional doctrine.
The court in the principal case recognized that delay dissipates
evidence of intoxication and renders tests to establish sobriety mean-
ingless. The majority accepted defense counsel's statement that, if
called, he would have attempted to procure a blood-alcohol test to
establish defendant's innocence. Accordingly, the majority reasoned
that the four hours after defendant's arrival at the jail constituted a
"critical stage" in the proceedings, because defendant could have es-
tablished a defense only during that time. The court concluded that
no distinction should be drawn between misdemeanors and felonies,
citing the precise language of the sixth amendment granting right to
counsel in "all criminal prosecutions," and noting that no such distinc-
tion was drawn by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainright.
The principal case could be interpreted as carrying the "critical
stage" test to the point that right to counsel attaches upon arrest. As
the Supreme Court noted in Escobedo,6 the time between arrest and
indictment (or information in state courts) is perhaps the most critical
in the criminal process. But this interpretation is guarded against in
the principal case by the court's express limitation of the issue to
"crime[s] involving the element of intoxication."7 Subsequent deci-
'The majority opinion refers to WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 22, which provides that
"in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person, or by counsel, .. ." but concludes that "the state constitutional provision should
receive the same definition and interpretation as that which has been given to a like
provision in the federal constitution by the United States Supreme Court." 67 Wash.
Dec. 2d at 723, 409 P.2d at 869. The rest of the court's analysis is based upon the
sixth amendment.
3368 U. S. 52 (1961).
' 378 U. S. 478 (1964).
372U. S. 335 (1963).
0 378 U. S. at 488.
7 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 723, 409 P.2d at 869.
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sions of the Washington court also refute an interpretation of the
principal case as extending right to counsel to the time of arrest.8
In Summers v. Rlay,9 a preliminary hearing at which the defendant
pleaded not guilty was held not to be a "critical stage" because no
defenses were lost, nor any evidence obtained, during the hearing.1°
Juxtaposed, the principal case and Summers distinguish between per-
missible and impermissible denial of counsel in post-arrest proceedings
according to the impact of denial at the trial. In the principal case,
a defense may have been lost through denial of counsel; in Summers,
no harmful consequences of denial resulted. It follows that right to
counsel does not attach upon arrest, when based on the "critical stage"
test, but only when denial of counsel may prejudice the merits of
defendant's case. The holding in the principal case that defendant was
entitled to counsel within four hours of his arrival at the jail should
be interpreted, in accordance with the court's delineation of the issue,
as limited to cases involving the element of intoxication. According
right to counsel upon arrest for persons accused of crimes involving
intoxication is an exception founded upon the possible loss of excrim-
inating evidence in a short time. It should be observed that the court's
phrase, "crime[s] involving the element of intoxication," may be ap-
plied to all crimes premised upon defendant's intoxication." In addi-
tion, the rationale may apply when defendant alleges, in defense to a
crime requiring specific intent, that intoxication incapacitated him from
entertaining the requisite intent.' 2
'State v. Louie 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 283, 410 P.2d 608 (1966) ; Summers v. Rhay,
67 Wash. Dec. 2d 889, 410 P.2d 608 (1966).
D Summers v. Rhay, supra note 8.
' 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 892, 410 P.2d at 410:
In the instant case, appellant pleaded not guilty at the preliminary hearing.
Nothing that there occurred could in any way have prejudiced his defense,
had be elected to go to trial. Not until his arraignment following the filing
of an information did he enter a plea of guilty to the offenses for which he is
not incarcerated. It follows that the preliminary hearing in the instant case
was not a critical stage in the proceedings; hence, the justice court did not
err in denying appellant's request that counsel be appointed to represent him at
that hearing.
Washington statutes proscribe criminal sanctions for intoxication under sun-
dry circumstances: WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 9.48.130 (1956) (liability of intoxicated
physician for professional acts causing death); 9.68.040 (1959) (appearing in
public place while intoxicated) ; 9.91.020 (1957) (operating railroad, steamboat,
vehicle, etc.); 66.44.110 (1961) (intoxication in public place); 71.08.010 (1959)(punishment for intoxication in public place as a breach of the peace); 77.16.070
(1955) (hunting while intoxicated).
1 WASH. REv. Copy § 9.01.114 (1956):
Intoxication no defense. No act committed by a person while in a state of
voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition,
but whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is
a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the
1966]
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Two problems raised by application of the "critical stage" test
merit examination. First, the analysis employed in determining
whether denial occurred at a "critical stage," and consequently whether
defendant's right to counsel had attached, is often influenced by events
transpiring after counsel was denied. In the principal case, defendant's
need for a lawyer was manifest at the time of denial. But in other
"critical stage" cases, defendant's need for a lawyer at the time of
denial may not become apparent until his trial. In both Hamilton v.
Alabama1  and Pointer v. Texas,'4 defendant was denied counsel
during a preliminary hearing. In Hamilton, holding the preliminary
hearing to be a "critical stage," the Court emphasized admission into
evidence at the trial of defendant's withdrawn guilty plea from the
preliminary hearing. In Pointer, the Court declined to find a "critical
stage," apparently because no harmful consequences of denial ap-
peared at trial. In those cases defendant's need for counsel, and con-
sequently his right to counsel, was determined in the light of events
transpiring at the subsequent trial. Thus, the "critical stage" test
governs by hindsight,'5 providing no identifiable criterion for police.
It is suggested that application of the "critical stage" test should cen-
ter upon circumstances as of the time of denial. Right to counsel, as
distinguished from the consequences of its denial, should be deter-
mined, not by the presence or absence of actual harm, but by the possi-
bility of harm, resulting from denial, inherent in the post-arrest pro-
ceeding in question. Thus, hopefully, identifiable guidelines may be
established for police which will minimize present uncertainty as to
when a defendant's right to counsel attaches. While this approach may
be expected to alleviate the administrative quandry facing law enforce-
ment agencies, it imparts a rigidity to analysis which renders the
court's task more difficult. When, as now, the court considers facts
at and after denial to determine when right to counsel attached, its
capacity to reach an intuitively "right" result on the appeal is en-
fact of his intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such
purpose, motive or intent.
See State v. Byers, 136 Wash. 620, 241 Pac. 9 (1925).1 368 U. S. 52 (1961).
380 U. S. 400 (1965).
'An uncritical passage in Summers v. Rhay, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 891, 410 P.2d
at 610, illustrates this hindsight application of the "critical stage" test. Discussing
White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963), the Washington court declared: "The
Supreme Court of the United States held that, when, at the trial on the merits, the
plea of guilty entered at the preliminary hearing was introduced in evidence, the
preliminary hearing thereby became a critical stage in the proceedings. ... " Argu-
ably when the "critical stage" test is applied, the police are unable to determine in
post-arrest proceedings whether the accused has a constitutional right to counsel.
[VOL. 41:601
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hanced. Yet reversal for denial of counsel, if that seems the "right"
result in a case, is practically and conceptually impossible unless it
be found that right to counsel had attached at the time of denial.
Consequently, if the court chooses to limit itself to circumstances as
of the time of denial to find a "critical stage," the post-arrest proceed-
ings which are held to be within this category may be expected to
proliferate.
The second problem in application of the "critical stage" test is the
type of prejudice required for reversal, once right to counsel has
attached and defendant's request for counsel has been denied. A num-
ber of courts appear to invoke a concept which may be termed "institu-
tional prejudice."16 Institutional prejudice does not call for a finding
of actual prejudice; reversal follows denial of the constitutional right
without regard to its actual impact on the defendant. The conviction
is reversed to prevent prejudice to the institutional values of the crim-
inal process. In the principal case, the majority relied upon institu-
tional prejudice," while the minority insisted upon a finding of actual
prejudice. 8 The institutional prejudice approach, however, would
appear to be inconsistent with adoption of a "critical stage" analysis
dependant solely on circumstances as of the time of denial. It is de-
sirable to maintain the court's capacity to reach a "right" result on the
appeal, based on all the facts. This capacity is diminished by limiting
"critical stage" analysis to facts as of the time of denial. But this
limitation may be justified as a reasonable solution to the administra-
tive aspects of the problem of when defendant's right to counsel at-
taches. The court's capacity for flexibility is also diminished by un-
qualified application of the institutional prejudice approach, requiring
reversal once right to counsel has attached and been denied. Recent
judicial analysis has centered around the question of "critical stage,"
i.e., whether defendant's right to counsel had attached. It is suggested
that this analytical flexibility be transferred to determination of the
"3White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52
(1961); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 637 (1961) (concurring opinion of
Douglas, J.); Smart v. Balokom, 352 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1955); But see Walton v. United States, 202
F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 728, 409 P.2d at 872: "Under the 'critical stage' rule, the
denial to the defendant of the assistance of his attorney after the officers had con-
ducted their tests and questioning, violated his constitutional right to have counsel
and due process, and any conviction obtained thereafter was void." (Emphasis
added.)
"67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 729, 409 P.2d at 872 (Finley, J., dissenting); 67 Wash.
Dec. 2d at 748, 409 P.2d 883 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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type of prejudice required to warrant reversal. On the other hand,
the concept of institutional prejudice is not without merit. Cases in-
volving denial of counsel during defendant's trial may justifiably be
resolved by resort to institutional prejudice. Yet when denial occurs
at a point more remote from the "criminal prosecution," institutional
prejudice should be relegated to the status of a factor considered in
conjunction with, not in derogation of, actual prejudice.
The court in the principal case did not consider the arguable applica-
bility of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v.
Illinois.9 Escobedo could be interpreted as holding that right to coun-
sel is absolute for all purposes when police procedure shifts from in-
vestigatory to accusatory, in relation to the defendant. Under this
interpretation, the majority in the principal case need not have ap-
plied the "critical stage" test because the defendant was an "accused"
upon arrest.2 0 Nevertheless, the Escobedo opinion appears to limit
itself to confession cases:
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusa-
tory-when the focus is upon the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession--our adversary system begins to operate, and under the cir-
cumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer.21
It has been asserted that Escobedo is "in fact a sixth amendment right
to counsel case as opposed to a fifth amendment confession case.1"2 2
Such assertions indicate the significance of the Supreme Court's con-
centration upon deprivation of counsel, rather than voluntariness, when
examining confessions.23 Two vital facts in Escobedo were that de-
fendant was, in effect, the accused, and the police were attempting
"to 'get him' to confess."24 Moreover, the crucial distinction between
investigation and accusation drawn by the Court is meaningful only
'°378 U. S. 478 (1965).
o "The effect of Escobedo is to extend the 'critical stage' of Hamilton forward
into the pre-indictment investigation to the point at which the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory." Comment, 77e Curious Confusion Surrounding Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 32 U. Ci L. REv. 560, 567 (1965).
378 U. S. at 492 (Emphasis added).
Comment, 32 U. CnI. L. REv. 560, 579 (1965).
Recent law review treatments of extended right to counsel have been, signifi-
cantly, in a confession context. E.g., Erker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah
v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MiNN. L. Rv. 47 (1964) ; Rothblatt &
Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraign-
inent, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24 (1960); Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 313 (1964) ;
Comment, 73 YALE L. J. 1000 (1964) ; Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78
HARv. L. REv. 154, 217 (1964).
378 U. S. at 485.
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in a confession context. It would appear that courts face alternative
tests for determining when right to counsel attaches: the "critical
stage" test of Hamilton should be applied in non-confession cases;
the investigatory-accusatory distinction of Escobedo should be applied
in confession cases. Accordingly, the principal case was correct in not
adverting to Escobedo.
The extent of a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases has never
been explicitely considered by the United States Supreme Court.25
In holding misdemeanors within the sixth amendment right to counsel,
the principal case relied upon broad statements in Gideon v. Wain-
right.2' The misdemeanor question was not, however, either at issue
or discussed in Gideon. Analogizing to decisions of the Supreme Court
which deny misdemeanants the right to jury trial,2 7 it is difficult to
sustain right to counsel in misdemeanor cases on constitutional lan-
guage alone.2 More recent decisions, however, indicate that right to
counsel may be extended to misdemeanors. In Holt v. Common-
wealth,20 the Court held that a conviction for contempt, apparently
a misdemeanor under state law,30 violated due process. The Court
stated in dictum that the defendants were entitled to counsel.' In
'Comment, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 48 CA.nF. L. Rv. 501(1960); However, see Comment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Coulsel in
Misdemeanor Cases, 19 Sw. L.J. 593 (1965).
372 U. S. 335 (1963). For example, "any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.. ." Id. at 344.
' District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1936) ; Shick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65 (1904). Accord, State ex rel. O'Brien v. Towne, 64 Wn. 2d 581, 392 P.2d 818
(1964).
' Grammatically, the sixth amendment phrase, "all criminal prosecutions," applies
equally to right to jury trial and right to counsel. Therefore, it would seem that
the phrase would be interpreted to mean the same thing when applied to both rights.
A possible ground for distinguishing between these two rights is formulated in
Morris, Poverty and Criminal Justice, 38 WASH. L. REv. 667, 697 (1963):
However, there is doubt that retained counsel could be barred from [a mis-
demeanor trial] without denying a defendant his right to fair trial. Conse-
quently, the counterargument arises that if a fair trial is denied when retained
counsel is excluded from a petty offense trial, then a fair trial is similarly denied
when an indigent defendant fails to be represented by counsel.
The assertion that retained counsel cannot be barred from misdemeanor trials is
well grounded. See State v. Davis, 171 La. 449, 131 So. 295 (1930) ; Brack v. State,
187 Md. 542, 51 A.2d 171 (1947); Kissinger v. State, 147 Neb. 983, 25 N.E.2d
829 (1947), 27 Nan. L. Ray. 87 (1948) ; Milliman v. State, 156 Tenn. 88, 238 S. W.
2d 70 (1951).
' 381 U. S. 131 (1965).
"VA. CODE § 18.1-292. In the five classes of cases within this statute, a judge
may punish for contempt summarily. The conviction in Holt fell either under the
first class, limited by VA. CODE § 18.1-295 to not more than $50 and/or ten days,
or the third class in which the penalty is within the judge's discretion. See Yoder
v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 823, 57 S.E. 581 (1907).
" 381 U. S. at 136.
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Patterson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,32 involving denial of
counsel in a misdemeanor case, the Supreme Court remanded a Mary-
land conviction for consideration in the light of Gideon.33 The fifth
circuit has held a state misdemeanor prosecution within the purview
of the sixth amendment, stating, "such disadvantages and consequences
[from lack of counsel] may weigh as heavily upon an accused mis-
demeanant as an accused felon.134 However, the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964 provides counsel only for felonies and misdemeanors other
than "petty offenses."35 Petty offenses are those for which the penalty
is not more than five hundred dollars fine or six months in jail, or
both. 6 While the Criminal Justice Act is not constitutional authority,
it expresses a congressional balancing of need for counsel in misde-
meanor prosecutions against practical considerations. The effect of
right to counsel upon bench and bar has historically resulted in such
balancing.8 Adequate defense for the accused 38 becomes a less com-
pelling factor with the diminishing gravity of his offense and conse-
quent punishment. Conversely, a conflicting social interest in the most
productive use of judicial and legal resources becomes more compelling.
In cases such as parking violation trials, which more closely resemble
2327 U.S. 776 (1963).
'The Maryland court, in turn, applied the rationale of Gideon and remanded for
a new trial. Patterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 1965). Accord, Evans v.
Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (misdemeanants prosecuted in federal court
are entitled to counsel).
78 Stat. 552 (1964), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A (1964). Note, however,
that proposed FED. R_ Cam. P. 44 requires appointment of counsel for "every
defendant." The Advisory Committee's notes state that the rules accord a broader
right to counsel than that for which compensation is provided in the Criminal
Justice Act because Rule 44 applies to petty offenses to be tried in the district courts.
c 18 U. S. C. § 1 (1958).
"Thus, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), limited right to counsel in state
prosecutions to capital cases. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the "special
circumstance" rule was gradually worn away, and Betts was overruled expressly in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). These cases represent a movement
in favor of the defendant, when balancing the individual's right to counsel and
society's conflicting practical demands. English development proceeds from the
opposite direction, first allowing representation by counsel in misdemeanor cases,
but not allowing representation by counsel even in the most serious felonies until
1695. See Heidebough & Becker, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases-An
Inquiry into the History and Practice in England and America, 28 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 351 (1953). Authorities tracing English development are collected in Comment,
48 CAn'. L. REV. 501 n.3 (1960).
'While counsel is important to the conduct of a defense in court, it is more
important that counsel be available to "investigate the facts and participate in those
necessary conferences between counsel and accused ... ." Powell v. Alabama, 287
U. S. 45, 61 (1932). The consequent demands on lawyers' time points to the
desirability of a public defender system. For pro and con views on public defenders,
see Dimrock, The Public Defender: A Step Towards A Police State?, 42 A.B.A.J.
1139 (1956) ; J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 174 (1949) ; Stewart, The Public Defender Systcm is
Unsound in Principle, 32 J. Aii. JUD. Soc'v 115 (1949).
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administrative regulation than criminal prosecutions, right to counsel
appears inappropriate. In the principal case, facing no controlling
authority, the court should have balanced these conflicting interests
before extending right to counsel to misdemeanants.
COMPENSATION FOR CONDEMNATION OF LAND
ENHANCED IN VALUE BY AGRICULTURAL ALLOTMENT
Defendant's farm, including 550 acres devoted to production of
cotton under an acreage allotment from the Department of Agriculture,
was condemned by the federal government for an irrigation project.
Defendant retained the right under section 1378 (a) of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act' to transfer its cotton quota to other property under its
ownership, and did so. Trial before a jury resulted in an award to
defendant based on the value of its property as a cotton farm, less the
value of the section 1378 right retained.2 The government objected on
the ground that the enhanced value to the land resulting from the
cotton allotment was not compensable when the owner utilized his
right to reestablish the allotment on other land. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Enhancement in land value
resulting from a cotton allotment, reduced by the value of the section
1378 right retained, must be included in determining compensation for
'The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 § 378(a), added by 72 Stat. 995 (1958),
as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1378(a) (1965), provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the allotment determined
for any commodity for any land from which the owner is displaced because of
acquistion of the land for any purpose, other than for the continued production
of alloted crops, by any Federal, State, or other agency having the right of
eminent domain shall be placed in an allotment pool and shall be available only
for use in providing allotments for other farms owned by the owner so displaced.
Upon application to the county committee, within three years after the date of
such displacement. .. any owner so displaced shall be entitled to have established
for other farms owned by him allotments which are comparable with allotments
determined for other farms in the same area which are similar except for the past
acreage of the commodity....
Commodities, the allotments for which are subject to the section 1378 right, are
corn, wheat, rice, peanuts, tobacco, and cotton.
- Defendant's witnesses set a valuation of $1,050,000 for the land with the allot-
ment attached. The government's experts assigned a value of $865,000, of which
$413,000 was enhancement by virtue of the allotment and $452,000 was the value of
the land alone. 350 F.2d at 685.
The portion of the trial court's instruction relating to the proper method for the
jury to arrive at a valuation was, 350 F.2d at 685 n.2:
It is my advice that the most reasonable approach to a solution of this problem is
for you first to agree upon the fair market value of Citrus Valley Farm on July 1,
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